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affects its capital structure. We study the effect of competition on leverage for firms acting 
in the US newspaper industry. Potential endogeneity between market structure and capital 
structure is addressed by exploiting the exogenous development of other mass media to 
instrument for the decline in the number of cities with competing newspapers. The results 
suggest that oligopolies have higher debt ratios than monopolies, controlling for other 
determinants of leverage. We also study the effect of capital structure on prices. For 
oligopolies, debt ratios show a significant and positive effect on advertising rates. The 
effect is not significant for monopolies. 
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1. Introduction 
In their famous survey published ten years ago, Harris and Raviv (1991) summarized our 
knowledge on the theory of capital structure. They also surveyed the empirical evidence 
that lends or denies support to the different theories. In their concluding tables showing the 
available empirical evidence for each theoretical result, there were some empty cells. The 
validity of some of the theories had not been evaluated by any empirical study. One of these 
empty cells showed the lack of empirical evidence on the effect of the extent of strategic 
interaction in the product markets on firms’ capital structure.
1 Ten years later, this vacuum 
still remains. 
 
Brander and Lewis (1986, 1988) and Maksimovic (1988) pioneered the analysis of the use 
of financial structure as a strategic variable in product market competition. These authors 
find that leveraging leads firms to aggressive competition. On the contrary, more recent 
papers by Showalter (1995), Damania (1997), Dasgupta and Titman (1998) and Faure-
Grimaud (2000) obtain that firms can use leverage to sustain more collusive equilibria.
2 If 
firms in situations of imperfect competition have strategic incentives to take on debt that 
are absent for monopolistic or (perfectly) competitive firms, we would expect the extent of 
competition faced by firms to affect their financial structure. Thus, the strategic-use-of-debt 
models predict that market structure affects capital structure. They also predict that 
leverage affects product market prices. 
 
                                                             
1 See Harris and Raviv (1991), Table V. Panel A or Table VII. Panel C. 
2 Glazer (1994) and Chevalier and Scharfstein (1996) also find that leveraged firms price higher, 
although they consider debt levels as exogenous rather than as strategic variables in market 
interaction.   2
These models typically have a first stage, in which firms in imperfect competition set their 
capital structure, and a second stage, in which those firms compete in the product markets. 
The available empirical evidence has focused on the second-stage effects of leverage on 
prices finding results that contradict the pioneer models. Chevalier (1995), Phillips (1995) 
and Chevalier and Scharfstein (1996) show that leveraged firms reduce output relative to 
non-leveraged ones. This evidence helps t o answer the question of whether leveraging 
leads firms to sustain higher or lower prices, but it does not shed light on whether the 
competitive conditions that firms face in the product markets affect their financial 
decisions. 
 
Why does such an important question lack empirical analysis? An extensive body of 
research has identified stylized facts on the determinants of capital structure, i.e. the 
relative proportions of debt and equity financing. Several firm characteristics -size, growth 
opportunities, p rofitability, non-debt tax shields, or the proportion of fixed assets, for 
example- have been shown to affect financial structure. Intra-industry similarities in capital 
structure have also been repeatedly found. However, the empirical evidence on the effect 
of product market characteristics on firms’ capital structure is very small. Titman and 
Wessels (1988)’s study of the effect of product uniqueness, Kovenock and Philips (1995, 
1997)’s analyses of recapitalization decisions, and Showalter (1999a)’s study of the effect 
of cost and demand uncertainty represent scarce exceptions to the underexploration of the 
effect of the conditions that firms face in the product markets on their capital structures. In 
particular, we are not aware of previous studies considering the extent of product market 
competition as a determinant of leverage.   3
 
A possible explanation for this lack of empirical analysis is potential endogeneity. Even 
though the strategic-use-of-debt-models predict an effect of competition on capital 
structure, a profuse literature, initiated by the “long-purse” stories of predatory pricing, 
considers the effect of capital structure on market structure through predation against 
financially constrained firms (Telser, 1966; Benoit, 1984; Fudenberg and Tirole, 1986; 
Poitevin, 1989; Bolton and Scharfstein, 1990) or through the use of debt for entry 
deterrence (McAndrews and Nakamura, 1992; Stenbacka, 1994; Fulghieri and Nagarajan, 
1996; Showalter, 1999b). A crucial feature of our analysis is that we address this 
endogeneity concern by exploiting an exogenous source of change in the extent of strategic 
interaction to study the effect of competition on capital structure. 
 
The US newspaper industry is particularly appropriate for our study not only because there 
has been significant variation in the extent of competition that firms face, but, mainly, 
because a major component of this variation, the decline in the number of cities with 
competing newspapers, is associated with an exogenous factor, the development of other 
mass media (AM and FM radio, and open and cable TV). We exploit this exogeneity in 
instrumental-variable regressions to address potential endogeneity concerns. The results 
suggest that the extent of product market competition affects capital structure: debt ratios 
are reduced as the extent of competition (i.e., the degree of strategic interaction) falls, 
controlling for other determinants of leverage. 
   4
In addition, we explore the effect of capital structure on newspaper advertising rates. If 
oligopolistic firms take on debt for strategic reasons, we would expect capital structure to 
affect prices. Previous studies have analyzed this issue considering only oligopolistic 
industries: Chevalier (1995) and Chevalier and Scharfstein (1996) analyze the supermarket 
industry, while Phillips (1995) studies the fiberglass, tractor-trailer, polyethylene, and 
gypsum industries. As mentioned, they found that leveraging leads firms to increase prices 
(although Phillips reports the opposite result for the gypsum industry). 
 
Our contribution to this previous research is to examine whether debt has a different effect 
on prices under oligopolistic than under monopolistic conditions. We are able to perform 
this study because the newspaper industry is populated by firms acting in monopolistic and 
oligopolistic markets. We exploit our results on the determinants of leverage to alleviate 
endogeneity concerns on the effect of capital structure on prices. For monopolies, our 
findings suggest that debt ratios have a non-significant effect on prices. For oligopolies, 
debt ratios show a significant and positive effect on prices. The oligopoly results coincide 
with the previous literature. 
 
Our findings contribute to fill Harris and Raviv (1991)’s empty cell by suggesting that the 
extent of strategic interaction that firms face in the product markets affects their capital 
structure. However, the results do not lend empirical support to the pioneer strategic-use-
of-debt authors, but to the models that show that leveraging allows firms to coordinate 
towards more collusive equilibria (Showalter, 1995; Damania, 1997; Dasgupta and 
Titman, 1998; and Faure-Grimaud, 2000).   5
 
In the rest of the paper, Section 2 discusses the advantages of the newspaper industry for 
our study. Section 3 analyzes the effect of the extent of product market competition on 
capital structure, and Section 4 studies the effect of capital structure on prices. Section 5 
presents our conclusions, and discusses suggestions for future research. The Appendix 
provides data definitions, sources, and summary statistics. 
 
2. The Newspaper Industry 
The strategic-use-of-debt models show that capital structure can be used as a value-
increasing device under imperfect competition. These incentives for taking on debt are only 
present in situations of strategic interaction. If oligopolistic firms have strategic incentives 
that affect their financial decisions that are not present for monopolistic or competitive 
firms, we would expect market structure to affect capital structure. Implicitly, these models 
predict that the extent of competition that firms face in the product markets affects their 
capital structure. In particular, they predict that, controlling for other determinants of 
leverage, oligopolistic firms have higher debt levels than m onopolistic or competitive 
firms. Our purpose is to study the effect on firms’ capital structure of the extent of product 
market competition that they face. We investigate this issue by analyzing the effect of 
competition on leverage for firms acting in the US newspaper industry. 
 
For several reasons, the newspaper industry provides an appropriate setting for our study. 
First, the local-market feature allows us to consider firms in the same industry under 
different market structures, avoiding the problem of cross-industry comparisons. This is   6
important because significant intra-industry similarities in capital structure have been 
reported (Bowen, Daley, and Huber, 1982; Bradley, Jarrell, and Kim, 1984; Harris and 
Raviv, 1991). 
 
Second, there is significant o ver-time variation in the extent of competition that our 
newspaper firms face. This variation arises, in part, from a continuing decline in the 
number of cities with competing newspapers. The number of cities with competing 
newspapers dramatically decreased from 502 in 1923, 109 in 1948, and 70 in 1958, to less 
than 20 in 1995. As our newspaper firms are parent companies that usually publish 
newspapers in more than one city, over-time variation also arises from mergers and 
acquisitions among newspaper chains. The development of newspaper chains persisted 
during the period of analysis (Dertouzos, 1982; Dertouzos and Trautman, 1990; Neiva, 
1996). There is also cross-sectional variation in the extent of competition faced by the 
sample firms, but this factor is less relevant as we will use firm fixed effects. 
 
Third, the reduction in the number of competing newspapers is associated with an 
exogenous factor, the development of other mass media (AM radio, FM radio, TV, cable 
TV), which has reduced newspapers’ share of advertiser and consumer demand (Rosse, 
1978; Compaine, 1980). Rosse and Dertouzos (1978) report that a 1% increase in TV’s 
share of aggregate advertising expenditure reduces newspapers’ advertising revenue by 
nearly 1%.
3 In an industry with high fixed costs, a demand reduction promptly induces exit. 
                                                             
3 The decline in the number of competing newspapers is also associated to the process of 
suburbanization, which has affected central-city newspaper demand; and to a greater social 
integration in American society, which has reduced the ability of newspaper firms to offer products 
differentiated by, for example, political, social, or ethnic characteristics (Rosse, 1978).   7
The exogenous development of radio and TV is correlated with the reduction in the number 
of competing newspapers, providing an instrument for the extent of competition that 
newspaper firms face. 
 
Fourth, newspapers are only published in monopolistic or oligopolistic (mainly 
duopolistic) markets.
4 Monopolies and oligopolies are sharply different market structures. 
In this industry, not only does there exist variation in the degree of competition that firms 
face, but this variation is significant and related to an exogenous factor. This feature is also 
useful because we additionally study the effect of capital structure on prices, comparing 
whether this effect is different for oligopolies than for monopolies. 
 
3. The Effect of Competition on Capital Structure 
We start by considering all the US parent companies included in the COMPUSTAT 
database whose major line of business is daily newspaper publication. This results in a 
sample of 441 firm-year observations corresponding to 27 parent companies that were 
active at some point between 1957 and 1995. We lose one observation per firm because 
we will use lagged variables. We also lose 75 observations because of missing 
information in COMPUSTAT.
5 We drop 18 observations for which COMPUSTAT reports 
                                                             
4 Out of hundreds of cities in which the firms in our sample publish newspapers, New York, 
Chicago, and Washington are the only ones which, at some point in time during the period of 
observation, had more than two competing newspapers. 
5 Most of these missing observations correspond to missing stock prices (used to obtain firm market 
values) which are not available because the firm’s stock was not publicly traded at that time.   8
a zero debt level.
6 The final sample has 22 firms and 321 firm-year observations in an 
unbalanced panel from 1964 to 1995. 
 
To analyze the effect of the degree of competition on capital structure, we regress debt 
ratios on a measure of the extent of product market competition and on variables 
controlling for size, profitability, growth opportunities, and non-debt tax shields. This 
approach follows previous studies of the determinants of leverage that show that these 
control variables affect capital structure (Bradley, Jarrell, and Kim, 1984; Titman and 
Wessels, 1988; Harris and Raviv, 1991;  inter alia). It is also plausible to argue that 
current shocks to capital structure affect these controls. For example, the strategic-use-of-
debt models predict that debt levels affect profitability. We alleviate these endogeneity 
concerns by lagging our control variables (Rajan and Zingales, 1995). We also include 
firm fixed effects and a time trend. Our main regression is:
 7 
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where for firm i in period t: 
  Debtit = Total Debt/Total Assets 
  Profitabilityit-1 is alternatively defined as: 
  Retained Earningsit-1 = Retained Earnings/Total Assets 
                                                             
6 We interpret these values as missing information. The results are robust to including these zero-
debt observations. All results reported but not presented are available upon request. 
7 Sources and summary statistics are presented in the Appendix.   9
  Return on Assets (ROA)it-1 = Operating Income/Total Assets 
  Return on Sales (ROS)it-1 = Operating Income/Sales 
  Sizeit-1 = ln(Sales in constant dollars) 
  Growth Opportunitiesit-1 = Market Value of Common Equity/Book Value of 
  Common Equity 
  Non Debt Tax Shieldit-1 = Depreciation and Amortization/Total Assets 
  Gi = Firm fixed effect 
  Tt = Linear time trend 

















  where: djit = 1 if firm i is the only firm publishing daily newspapers (of general  
    interest and English language) in city j at time t.
8,9,10 
djit = 0 if firm i is not the only firm publishing daily newspapers (of general 
interest and English language) in city j at time t.
11 
    j = 1,...,J ” cities in which firm i publishes daily newspapers (of general  
    interest and English language) at time t. 
    popjt = population of city j at time t. 
                                                             
8 Newspapers published by the same firm in the same city (for example, morning and evening 
editions) are not considered competing newspapers. 
9  Markets under joint operating agreements (JOA’s) are considered monopolistic markets. JOA’s 
are agreements between publishing firms which allow two newspapers in the same city to pool their 
advertising, circulation, production and business operations while maintaining separate editorial 
departments. JOA’s are exempt from antitrust law by the Newspaper Preservation Act of 1970. 
10 The national newspapers, Wall Street Journal and USAToday, are not considered.   10
 
As described above, our firms are parent companies that typically participate in more than 
one market. This measure of competition is a weighted average of the degree of 
competition that firms face in the markets in which they participate. The weights are given 
by the size of the cities. The measure equals 0 for a pure oligopolist and 1 for a pure 
monopolist. Each city is considered an individual newspaper market.
12 Although 
newspapers from different cities may compete for national advertisers, they do not compete 
for readers and local advertisers.
13 Daily newspapers also face competition from suburban 
newspapers, less-than-daily newspapers, shoppers and other media (radio and TV). 
However, in agreement with the literature on newspaper competition and antitrust case law 
(Rosse, 1978; Simon, Primeaux and Rice, 1986; Busterna, 1988; Bucklin, Caves and Lo, 
1989; Fee and Hadlock, 2000; inter alia), our measure considers that, although these other 
media reduce newspapers’ demand, they represent imperfect newspaper substitutes. There 
is a significant difference in the degree of competition that a daily newspaper faces when 
there is another daily newspaper published in the same city. The negative and significant 
effect of the presence of competing newspapers on advertising rates presented in the next 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
11 No difference is made for oligopolies with different numbers of firms. As mentioned above, in the 
sample there are very few cases of cities with more than two competing newspapers. 
12 City boundaries are confused in some metropolitan areas. For competition in New York City, 
newspapers in the five boroughs are considered competitors of each other (Rosse, 1978). For 
competition in Los Angeles, the Daily News in San Fernando Valley is not considered a competitor 
of the central-city newspapers Times Mirror and Herald-Examiner (Tillinghast, 1988). 
13 Newspaper firms collect revenues from circulation and advertising. Advertising revenues are 
obtained from three categories: local display, national display, and classified. Display advertising 
appears throughout the paper and often involves illustrations. Local (or retail) display is sold to local 
advertisers, and national (or general) display is sold to national advertisers. Classified advertising 
appears on special pages ordered by item. Rosse (1978) calculates that in a typical newspaper in 
1977, 57% of revenues came from display advertising (50.1% from local display, and 6.9% from 
national display), 18.4% from classified advertising, and 24.6% from circulation.   11
section confirms how relevant it is for a newspaper to face competition from another 
newspaper in the same city. 
 
It is important to notice that if a firm becomes a monopoly through the exit of a rival, we 
would expect its profitability, its size and its growth opportunities (its stock price) to 
increase. Through the effect on these variables, we would then expect market structure to 
show an effect on capital structure. However, this would not be the direct effect of 
competition on capital structure that we try to capture. The problem is less severe for size 
and growth opportunities. According to the literature, the increase in these variables raises 
debt ratios. Thus, controlling imperfectly for firms’ size and growth opportunities would 
spuriously render a positive relationship between our PMC variable and debt ratios (the 
opposite sign to the prediction of the strategic-use-of-debt models). Instead, the literature 
on the determinants of capital structure predicts a negative effect of profitability on 
leverage, as firms prefer to raise capital from internal sources rather than from outside 
investors (the “pecking order” theory of Myers and Majluf, 1984). Thus, failure to properly 
control for profitability may induce a spurious correlation between monopolization and 
low debt levels, which could be erroneously interpreted as support for the predictions of 
the strategic-use-of-debt models. To properly evaluate these  theories, we need to be 
particularly careful in controlling for profitability in our study. We consider three different 
Profitability proxies. First, as theory predicts that leverage levels are negatively related to 
the amount of retained earnings, we consider the accounting variable that best represents 
this theoretical concept: Retained Earnings (scaled by Total Assets). Alternatively, we   12
also consider ROA (Return on Assets) and ROS (Return on Sales) as measures of current 
profitability. 
 
The OLS results are presented in Table 1. Using any of the three profitability proxies or the 
three together, the results show a negative and significant coefficient for the PMC variable. 
Controlling for size, profitability, non-debt tax shields and growth opportunities, 
oligopolies show higher debt levels than monopolies. As the extent of product market 
competition falls (as PMC increases), debt ratios are reduced. The control variables are 
significant and have the same sign as in previous empirical studies (Harris and Raviv, 
1991). The positive time trend coincides with the systematic increase in leverage for US 
corporations since World War II (Taggart, 1985). The results are robust to restricting 
attention to a balanced subpanel, which addresses potential survivorship bias; to the use of 
different proxies for the controls and the dependent variable;
14 to the inclusion of the zero-
debt observations; and to the introduction of the profitability proxies in pairs. 
 
These first results are vulnerable to the possibility that firms’ financial situation may affect 
the degree of competition that they face. For example, financially healthy firms could use 
their deeper pockets to prey on rivals and eventually become local monopolies (Telser, 
1966; Benoit, 1984; Fudenberg and Tirole, 1986; Poitevin, 1989; Bolton and Scharfstein, 
1990), or firms can strategically design their capital structure to deter potential entrants 
(McAndrews and Nakamura, 1992; Fulghieri and Nagarajan, 1996; Stenbacka, 1994; 
Showalter, 1999b). Furthermore, the mergers and acquisitions that affect the extent of 
                                                             
14 We have alternatively defined the debt ratio as Total Debt/Book Value of Equity, and Total 
Debt/Book Value of the Firm.   13
product market competition could depend on the firms’ financial situation. We address this 
endogeneity concern by estimating a 2SLS regression instrumenting for PMC. 
 
As discussed above, the decline in the number of cities with competing newspapers is 
associated with the development of other media. We instrument for PMC using the number 
of TV stations, AM and FM radio stations, and cable TV subscribers to measure the 
development of these mass media.
15 For being valid instruments, we need the evolution of 
these media to be truly exogenous to our firms’ financial situation. We have two concerns 
here. First, the choice of the markets in which our newspaper chains expand through 
mergers and acquisitions may be affected by the firms’ financial conditions. If we consider 
the number of other media in all the markets in which a newspaper chain participates at 
each time, we will face the following problem. Even if the development of new media in 
two cities is absolutely e xogenous to the firm’s financial structure, when its financial 
situation makes preferable for the chain to acquire a newspaper in a city with a certain 
media development rather than in the other, the capital structure will be affecting the set of 
cities over which we define our instruments. Second, the entry of new media in a 
metropolitan market might be affected by the financial condition of the firms that publish 
newspapers in that city. These two issues could invalidate the exogeneity of the 
instruments. 
 
We use two alternative definitions to address these problems. First, we use the total 
number of AM radio, FM radio and TV stations, and of cable TV subscribers for the whole 
US for every firm. This strategy is exaggeratedly safe in guaranteeing exogeneity (any effect   14
of the financial condition of a given firm on entry by other media in its city markets is 
negligible at the country level), but it has the shortcoming that the instruments do not vary 
cross-sectionally. Alternatively, we use for each firm the total number of AM radio, FM 
radio and TV stations, and of cable TV subscribers for the state in which the firm had its 
headquarters at the time the firm is incorporated into our sample.
16 The headquarters are 
always located in the city in which the firm publishes its flagship newspaper.
17 In this case, 
exogeneity is provided by the fact that the potential effect of the financial condition of a 
given firm on entry in its city markets could only be very small at the state level. On the 
other hand, these instruments now vary cross-sectionally. In both cases, our instruments are 
not affected by changes through mergers and acquisitions in the set of markets in which our 
firms operate. In the first case, our instruments are defined at the country level. In the 
second, the state that we consider for each firm is fixed and, therefore, mergers and 
acquisitions do not affect our geographical definition for each firm. 
 
In Table 2 the instruments are defined at the country level. Using any of the profitability 
proxies or the three together, the joint F-statistics for the four instruments in the first stage 
regressions are always highly significant. In Table 3, for each firm the instruments are 
defined at the state level for the state in which the firm had its headquarters. Again, in the 
first stage regressions the joint F-statistics for the four instruments are highly significant. 
Using either set of instruments, the 2SLS results in Tables 2 and 3 confirm our previous 
findings. Controlling for potential endogeneity by using the development of other media to 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
15 Note that the period under consideration is previous to the Internet explosion. 
16 The number of radio and TV stations is normalized by state surface. The number of cable TV 
subscribers is normalized by state population.   15
instrument for changes in the extent of competition, our results hold: as the degree of 
competition falls, debt ratios are reduced. Again, the results are robust to restricting 
attention to a balanced subpanel, which addresses potential survivorship bias; to the use of 
different proxies for the controls and the dependent variable, to the inclusion of the zero-
debt observations, and to the introduction of the profitability proxies in pairs. 
 
These results suggest that the extent of competition that firms face in the product markets 
affects their capital structure. In particular, oligopolies show higher debt ratios than 
monopolies, controlling for other determinants of leverage. The evidence is consistent with 
the reduced-form predictions of the strategic-use-of-debt models that find that leveraging 
can be used as a value-increasing strategy in product market competition. If oligopolistic 
newspaper firms take on debt for strategic reasons, as these models suggest, we would 
additionally expect to observe an effect of capital structure on prices. We now turn to 
analyze this issue. 
 
4. The Effect of Capital Structure on Prices 
We start by considering all the newspapers included in the Top 50 according to circulation 
for at least one year between 1984 and 1993. The analysis starts in 1984 because since 
July 1 of that year advertising prices for all the newspapers are expressed in the same 
space units, the Standard Advertising Unit (SAU). The publication of our data source 
(American Association of Advertising Agencies, several issues) was interrupted after 
1993. As this publication only appeared in odd years, we maintain a biannual data 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
17 For example, we consider California for Times Mirror Co. and McClatchy, Illinois for Tribune 
Co., New York for New York Times Co., Dow Jones and Gannett, and so on.   16
structure. We restrict our attention to newspapers published by US public parent 
companies, for which there is financial information available from COMPUSTAT. 
 
From the initial sample, newspapers published for more than one market,
18 and newspapers 
published under Joint Operating Agreements are excluded.
19 We also exclude newspapers 
published by firms that do not have newspaper publication as their major line of business 
as we will use our intra-industry results from Section 3 to instrument for debt levels.
20 The 
use of these instruments makes us lose four observations because of missing information in 
COMPUSTAT.
21 Two editions of the same newspaper or two newspapers published by the 
same firm in the same city are considered one newspaper (and the combination advertising 
rate is used). We concentrate on display advertising rates (local and national), which 
represent the main source of newspaper revenues and are uniformly reported by our data 
source.
22 The final sample has 27 newspapers and 105 newspaper-year observations from 
1985 through 1993. 
 
                                                             
18 It is not possible to define comparable market variables for these newspapers. This criterion 
excludes the national newspapers  USA Today and Wall Street Journal; and New York Newsday, 
which was published for both the Long Island and New York City markets. 
19 This criterion excludes all the newspaper-year observations for Times, Seattle; Free-Press and 
News, Detroit; and Press, Pittsburgh; and some newspaper-year observations for Herald, Miami. 
20 This criterion excludes  News, Buffalo, published by Berkshire Hathaway Inc.; and  Star-
Telegram, Forth Worth, and Star-Times, Kansas City, published by Capital Cities/ABC. 
21 See footnote 5. 
22 There is strong price discrimination by newspaper firms between local and national advertisers 
(see American Association of Advertising Agencies). Prices for national advertisers are about double 
those for local advertisers.   17
We analyze the effect of capital structure on prices, controlling for demand and supply 
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The equation states that advertising prices for newspaper  i at time t are a function of 
variables affecting advertising space demand and supply: demographic variables (city 
population, which instruments for circulation),
24 cost variables (labor, paper, and ink),
25 
chain size, market structure (oligopoly or monopoly), and parent company’s capital 
structure.
26 We also include newspaper fixed effects. 
 
The strategic-use-of-debt models predict that firms use capital structure to affect market 
equilibria in situations of strategic interaction. As monopolies would not have such an 
incentive to take on debt, we allow the effect of debt on prices to be different for 
monopolies than for oligopolies by including as explanatory variables both the debt ratio, 
and the interaction between debt ratio and market structure. Our interest is focused on the 
                                                             
23 Data definition, sources and summary statistics are presented in the Appendix. 
24 The results are robust to the inclusion of squared city population, income and income per capita, 
besides population; and to the definition of these demographic variables at the metropolitan 
statistical area or at the city level. All these variables show a high degree of collinearity among them. 
25 The cost variables Paper and Ink correspond to commodities priced at the national level. 
26 It is not necessary to control for multimarket contact between the newspaper chains in the sample 
because it is negligible. There were only two cases in which firms met in more than one market: 
Chicago Tribune Co. and News America Pub. Co. (R. Murdoch) met in Chicago and New York in   18
last two coefficients, which measure the effect of capital structure on prices under 
monopolistic and oligopolistic conditions. 
 
The OLS results in the first two columns of Table 4 indicate a negative coefficient for the 
Debt Ratio variable (although it is not significant for the national rates), and a positive and 
significant coefficient for the interacted  Debt Ratio*Oligopoly variable. However, we 
again have to deal here with endogeneity concerns. Just as firms’ debt levels may affect 
their prices, demand or supply shocks may affect their financial positions. We address this 
problem by estimating our regression in 2SLS using our results from the previous section to 
instrument for debt ratios. We use parent company’s PMC, Profitability,
27 Size, Non Debt 
Tax Shield,  Growth Opportunities, and the time trend as instruments for debt. As 
discussed before, these instruments could also be affected by current supply or demand 
shocks. We alleviate these problems by lagging the instruments.
28 These endogeneity 
concerns are further mitigated by the fact that our balance sheet data are at the parent 
company level, while our prices are at the newspaper level. For most of the newspapers in 
our sample, each of these newspapers represent only a portion of the businesses of the 
parent company, and therefore we expect that current shocks affecting these prices only 
have a moderate effect on the parent company accounts. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
1985, and New York Times Co. and News America Pub. Co. met in Boston and New York in 
1993. 
27 We present the results using  Retained Earnings, rather than  ROA or  ROS, to proxy for 
profitability because it reflects past profitability and, thus, is less likely to be affected by current 
shocks. The results are robust to considering the other profitability proxies. 
28 For prices as of July 1 of year t, we use instruments as of December 31 of year t-2.   19
We present the 2SLS results in the second two columns of Table 4.
29 They indicate a non-
significant coefficient for the Debt Ratio variable, and a positive and significant coefficient 
for the interacted Debt Ratio*Oligopoly variable. For both rates, we reject the hypothesis 
that the sum of these two coefficients equals zero at standard confidence levels. For 
monopolies, debt ratios have a non-significant effect on prices for both local and national 
advertising rates. For oligopolies, debt ratios show a positive and significant effect on 
prices for both local and national rates. These results lend support to the  view that 
leveraging allows firms to achieve higher equilibrium prices in situations of product 
market interaction. They coincide with previous findings for oligopolistic industries by 
Chevalier (1995), Phillips (1995), and Chevalier and Scharfstein (1996). The control 
variables show that labor costs have positive effect on prices, and that monopolies charge 
higher rates than oligopolies.
30 
 
We perform some robustness checks of our results in Table 5. First, we control for local 
business-cycle fluctuations t hat could be affecting both prices and financial conditions 
(Chevalier and Scharfstein, 1996). In the first two columns, we include the local 
unemployment rate in our regressions without affecting our results. Second, we control for 
newspaper quality, which may be affected by financial conditions and related to prices. In 
the second two columns of Table 5, we proxy for newspaper quality using the number of 
personnel in titled editorial positions (Bucklin, Caves and Lo, 1989). Our results are 
robust to this  specification. Similar results are obtained when including other quality 
proxies, such as the number of special sections, special editions, supplements and 
                                                             
29 In the first stage, the joint F-statistic for the instruments is highly significant.   20
magazines, or a dummy variable indicating whether the newspaper publishes zoned 
editions. Our results are also robust to the inclusion of time schedule and tabloid dummies, 
to the exclusion of the time trend as an instrument, and to the inclusion of the time trend as a 
control. The results also hold when our robust standard errors are clustered by firm-year, 
in order to correct for potential lack of independence in the error term for different 




The strategic-use-of-debt models show how leveraging can be used as a value-increasing 
device in imperfect competition. This strategic incentive to take on debt will be absent for 
monopolistic or competitive firms. Implicitly, these models predict that oligopolistic firms 
have higher debt levels than monopolistic or competitive firms. Our main contribution is to 
assess the effect of the extent of competition that firms face in the product markets on their 
capital structure. In the newspaper industry, we find that debt ratios decrease as the extent 
of product market competition falls. Controlling for other determinants of leverage, 
oligopolies show higher debt ratios than monopolies. 
 
We also explore the effect of capital structure on prices. For monopolies, debt ratios have 
a non-significant effect on prices. For oligopolies, on the contrary, this effect is significant 
and positive. Taken together, our empirical findings are consistent with the predictions of 
the strategic-use-of-debt models that argue that firms engaged in situations of strategic 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
30 The negative and highly significant coefficient for the Oligopoly dummy confirms how relevant it 
is for a newspaper whether another daily newspaper is published in the same city.   21
interaction can use leverage to sustain more collusive equilibria (Showalter, 1995; 
Damania, 1997; Dasgupta and Titman, 1998; and Faure-Grimaud, 2000). 
 
The US newspaper industry is particularly appropriate for our study of the effect of 
competition on capital structure because there were significant and exogenous changes in 
the extent of competition that newspaper firms face. We exploit the exogenous development 
of other mass media to address potential endogeneity concerns in our capital structure 
regressions. For the study of the effect of capital structure on prices, the variation in 
financial conditions in this industry cannot be directly associated to exogenous shocks, like 
the leveraged buyouts and recapitalizations considered in Chevalier (1995) and Phillips 
(1995), or, even safer, the effect of business cycles in Chevalier and Scharfstein (1996). 
However, by exploiting our results on the determinants of capital structure and the fact that 
our newspapers represent only a fraction of the businesses of their parent companies, we 
have been able to obtain satisfying results in instrumental-variable regressions. It is also 
reassuring that these price results coincide with previous findings in the literature. 
 
The strategic-use-of-debt models show that, under imperfect competition, firms may have 
strategic incentives to take on debt. Monopolistic or (perfectly) competitive firms will not 
have similar incentives. Graphically, these theories predict an inverted U -shaped 
relationship between concentration and debt levels, i.e., that oligopolistic firms have 
higher debt levels than monopolistic or competitive firms. We have explored one part of 
this prediction by comparing debt ratios of monopolies and oligopolies. It would be 
interesting to compare leverage levels for a sample considering monopolistic,   22
oligopolistic, and competitive firms. Since it seems unlikely that there exists an industry 
with firms acting in such a variety of market structures, this should probably be performed 
as an inter-industry study. This inverted U-shape would coincide with similar findings for 
the relationship between concentration and other strategic variables, such as advertising or 
R&D expenditure levels.   23
Appendix 
Data Definition and Sources 
Variable  Definition  Source 
Debt  Total Debt/Total Assets  COMPUSTAT 




Retained Earnings/Total Assets  COMPUSTAT 
ROA  Operating Income/Total Assets  COMPUSTAT 
ROS  Operating Income/Sales  COMPUSTAT 
Growth 
Opportunities 
Market Value of Common Equity/Book Value of 
Common Equity 
COMPUSTAT 
Size  Ln(Sales in constant dollars)  COMPUSTAT 
Non Debt Tax 
Shield 
Depreciation and Amortization/Total Assets  COMPUSTAT 
US AM Radio  US AM radio stations  Television & Cable Factbook 
US FM Radio  US FM radio stations  Television & Cable Factbook 
US TV  US television stations on air  Television & Cable Factbook 
US Cable  US cable TV subscribers (in thousands)  Television & Cable Factbook 
State AM 
Radio and  
State FM 
Radio 
AM or FM stations/Surface in square miles (at the state 
level).† 
Broadcasting, Broadc. & 
Cablecasting, Broadc. & Cable 
Market Place, Broadc. & Cable 
Yearbooks 
State TV  TV stations/Surface in square miles (at the state level).† Broadcasting Yearbook, Broadc. & 
Cablecasting Yearbook, Television 
& Cable Factbook, State and 
Metropolitan Area Data Book 




Rate per inch for a 1,000 inch-annual bulk contract 
(most representative contract according to A.A.A.A.) 
for local or national advertisers (combination rate for 
two editions of the same newspaper or two newspapers 
published by same firm in same city) 
Newspaper Rate Differentials: 
A.A.A.A. Study of General and 
Retail Advertising Rates, American 
Association of Advertising Agencies
Population  City population  E&P Market Guide 
Wage  Publication industry (SIC 2711) wage at the state level  Employment and Wages -Annual 
Averages-, Employment and 
Earnings, Bureau of Labor 
Statistics (BLS) 
Paper  Newsprint price index  Producer Price Indexes, BLS 
Ink  Printing ink price index  Producer Price Indexes, BLS 
Group Size  Number of newspapers published by the chain  E&P International Yearbook 
Unemployment Metropolitan statistical area unemployment rate  Unemployment in States and Local 
Areas, BLS 
Editors  Total number of personnel in titled editorial positions 
(news executives, editors and managers) 
E&P International Yearbook 
Oligopoly  Dummy=1 if newspaper is a central-city oligopolist, =0 
if newspaper is a central-city monopolist 
E&P International Yearbook 
† For some years for which state level data are not available, the series were completed using the 
evolution of the national data for extrapolation.   24
Summary Statistics 
Debt Study 
Variable  Mean  Std. Deviation  Min  Max 
Debt  0.20179  0.12855  0.00011  0.55727 
PMC  0.62989  0.40816  0  1 
Retained Earnings  0.48438  0.15474  0.09132  1.00170 
ROA  0.20700  0.06221  0.06353  0.50099 
ROS  0.20174  0.06092  0.05150  0.54983 
Growth Opportunities  2.59079  1.71352  0.36009  16.07037 
Size  5.43905  1.00893  2.71621  7.07791 
Non Debt Tax Shield  0.04309  0.01264  0.01603  0.09745 
US AM Radio  4749.804  205.887  4126  4990 
US FM Radio  5012.607  1275.939  1597  7240 
US TV  1196.645  241.6426  668  1533 
US Cable  30927.01  19391.39  1275  60280 
State AM Radio  0.01033  0.02636  0.00019  0.10294 
State FM Radio  0.01711  0.04821  0.00013  0.20588 
State TV  0.00947  0.03064  0.00007  0.11764 
State Cable  0.10874  0.07401  0.00688  0.28072 




Variable  Mean  Std. Deviation  Min  Max 
Local Rate  76.43219  41.10419  24.87  197.85 
National Rate  156.7704  84.33644  55.89  412 
Population  1283845  1914985  129990  7635041 
Wage  456.1905  101.7461  260  858 
Paper  107.9578  5.71111  100  115.11 
Ink  116.977  11.22427  100  128.5572 
Group Size  17.09524  21.36115  1  83 
Unemployment  5.54761  1.53423  2.7  9.8 
Editors  56.6  24.02146  22  147 
Oligopoly  0.35238  0.48000  0  1 
Debt  0.25355  0.12012  0.00618  0.55727 
Year  1989.324  2.83011  1985  1993 
Retained Earnings  0.45359  0.14853  0.09132  0.92983 
Growth Opportunities  2.94173  1.52991  1.47346  16.07037 
Size  6.21683  0.75127  4.62230  7.07791 
Non Debt Tax Shield  0.04750  0.01136  0.01961  0.09745 
PMC  0.54120  0.38674  0  1   25
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Table 1 
Dependent Variable: Total Debt/Total Assets 
Variables  (A)  (B)  (C)  (D) 












    -0.34851*** 
(-7.79) 
ROA    -0.44722*** 
(-3.68) 
  -0.15884 
(-1.02) 








































         
Fixed effects  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Observations  321  321  321  321 
Method  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS 
Robust t-statistics are in parentheses. The controls Retained Earnings, ROA, ROS, Growth 
Opportunities, Size, and Non Debt Tax Shield are lagged. * Significant at the 10% level. ** 
Significant at the 5% level. *** Significant at the 1% level.   29
 
Table 2 
Dependent Variable: Total Debt/Total Assets 
Variables  (A)  (B)  (C)  (D) 












    -0.57237*** 
(-5.09) 
ROA    -0.10095 
(-0.45) 
  0.71832** 
(1.97) 








































         
Fixed effects  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Observations  321  321  321  321 
Method  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS 
Robust t-statistics are in parentheses. The controls Retained Earnings, ROA, ROS, Growth 
Opportunities, Size, and Non Debt Tax Shield are lagged. The instruments are at the 
country level: US AM Radio, US FM Radio, US TV, and US Cable. * Significant at the 
10% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. *** Significant at the 1% level.   30
 
Table 3 
Dependent Variable: Total Debt/Total Assets 
Variables  (A)  (B)  (C)  (D) 












    -0.53612*** 
(-4.46) 
ROA    -0.30828** 
(-2.09) 
  0.57626 
(1.43) 








































         
Fixed effects  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Observations  321  321  321  321 
Method  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS 
Robust t-statistics are in parentheses. The controls Retained Earnings, ROA, ROS, Growth 
Opportunities, Size, and Non Debt Tax Shield are lagged. The instruments are at the state 
level: State AM Radio, State FM Radio, State TV, and State Cable for the state in which 
the firm’s headquarter is located. * Significant at the 10% level. ** Significant at the 5% 
level. *** Significant at the 1% level.   31
Table 4 
Dependent variable: Advertising Rates 
Variables  OLS  2SLS 
  Local Rate  National Rate  Local Rate  National Rate 


































































         
Fixed effects  YES  YES  YES  YES 
F-stat.
†  4.52**  3.65*  3.38*  5.20** 
Observations  105  105  105  105 
Robust t -statistics are in parentheses. The 2SLS instruments are lagged PMC, lagged 
Retained Earnings, lagged Growth Opportunities, lagged Size, lagged Non Debt Tax 
Shield, and time trend. † Null hypothesis:  Debt Ratio + Debt Ratio*Oligopoly = 0. * 
Significant at the 10% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. *** Significant at the 1% level.   32
Table 5 
Dependent variable: Advertising Rates 
Variables  Local Rate  National Rate  Local Rate  National Rate 




















































   






















         
Fixed effects  YES  YES  YES  YES 
F-stat.
†  3.00*  3.98**  3.05*  5.01** 
Observations  105  105  105  105 
Method  2SLS  2SLS  2SLS  2SLS 
Robust t -statistics are in parentheses. The instruments are lagged PMC, lagged Retained 
Earnings, lagged Growth Opportunities, lagged Size, lagged Non Debt Tax Shield, and time 
trend. † Null hypothesis: Debt Ratio + Debt Ratio*Oligopoly = 0. * Significant at the 10% 
level. ** Significant at the 5% level. *** Significant at the 1% level. Universidad Torcuato Di Tella, Business School Working Papers 
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